Constitutional Features in the Progress of Universal International Organisation Essay

Question: Analyse the evolution of constitutional features in the progress of universal international organisation, pointing out lessons learned by United Nations from League of Nations.


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In assessing the League of Nations, attention has been paid overwhelmingly to its achievements in maintaining international peace and security. This approach overshadowed its other more successful accomplishments1.

While in 1920’s the League had some success in dealing with armed conflicts, like the 1925 Greco-Bulgarian Incident, during 1930’s it showed inability to deal with big-scale powerful states’ wars, like 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria and 1935 Italo-Abyssinian War. Its failures were mainly due to half-hearted measures, reflected in unpreparedness to contribute states’ own military forces and vacillating, highly self-interest orientated Anglo-French appeasement policy towards Italy, rather than Covenant’s defects. There was no compromise between states in disarmament talks either and peace and security treaties – Locarno Pact 1925 and Kellogg-Briand Pact 1928 – were unenforceable, just like the few disarmament treaties2.

The League Covenant devoted scarce attention to economic and social matters, while valuable work was done in this area. The 1939 Bruce Report had promoted League’s reorganisation to achieve more independence from political dominance, legitimising practical expansion of its activities, and though war prevented its implementation, it provided experience for United Nations in its organisation. The League’s main problem, apart from its origin lying in existing unavailing practice4, was lack of co-operative will and independent impartial power, inability to submit to compulsory jurisdiction of international organisation. It is argued that UN Charter had been more successful than League Covenant, escaping its restricted, outdated provisions for particular, post-World

War 1 peace.

This work shall be concerned with internal features of international organisations.

Main Body:

* Membership – The League of Nations was envisaged as a Great Powers club and its

members were essentially WW1 victors. Art. 1 of League Covenant identified their participation as necessary for organisation’s success, although Germany and Russia were initially deliberately excluded. Prospectively sovereign states, like India, were also eligible for membership, which set important precedent of inclusiveness in world organisation. The League’s problem in practice was not only USA’s full-time absence, but also lack of effective participation from Germany and Japan, which terminated by mid 1930’s. Nor was Soviet Union a constant member, while Italy had itself flouted League’s purpose by invading Abyssinia. There was no stability due to withdrawals, which the Covenant itself legitimised6, unwisely prejudicing universality goal7, and France with UK were the only two continuous Great Power members. The League did not have the right states at the right time, despite maximum membership of 60 (1934). Effectively, it was more regional than universal in terms of membership of significant states.

The United Nations had included the common requirement, used in League Covenant, of ‘peace-loving’ states in the Charter (Art. 4(1)) and its members were again anti-aggressor/victor states in WW2, but more importantly it secured Great Powers inclusion, which was so missed in the League. The UN had also admitted states not fully sovereign8, following open-mindedly League practice, apparently in appreciation of the good start of its universality policy. It aimed to improve geographic distribution, while wide-ranging states wished to join, which became a crucial step in gradual integration of states into international order. Importantly, UN has encountered no instances of withdrawal – Indonesia’s yearlong absence was minor exception9 – improving greatly over League’s record of practice; UN Charter made no provision for withdrawal, which possibly contributed to stability in organisation’s composition.

Similarly, Art. 5 and 6 suspension and expulsion provisions were never used, despite such pressures from African states against South Africa and Arab states against Israel in 1960’s, which is explained by UN’s learning League’s lesson in preserving states’ membership thereby controlling them10, or alternatively likely preclusion of such decision by possible veto applying to procedure. In fact, League’s lack of effective membership became succeeded in United Nations by growing applications and subsequent overcrowding membership when many new members could not yet contribute materially to the organisation. From 1950 to 1955, this development was stifled by totally new problem – exclusion of membership applications on political grounds, involving USA and USSR vetoing applications of states of opposing political orientation. Interestingly, despite this, UN would not agree to change its practice, while Australia, Argentina and Peru made proposals to obviate it.

This incident had shown that inclusion of major powers in UN did not necessarily secure unity between them; it upset balance of power/influence within organisation just like military rivalry did outside the League, endangering progression of universality in its membership. By 1965, however, UN Charter was amended11, expanding Security Council and Economic and Social Council memberships, as in the League, precipitated by pressures for increased representation of Afro-Asian states. Nevertheless, Korea, Vietnam and Germany’s absence and China’s exclusion from effective participation12, because of rival regimes dividing these states, had until their inclusion presented significant mitigation to universality and negotiations with them allegedly posed much problem for security maintenance. Today, UN has achieved universality almost fully – from Germany to Liechtenstein, both failing Charter principles, but in practice unhindered to become members – though narrow political considerations stood on its way occasionally; Third World vigorous universality proponents in 1960’s/70’s wanted South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia excluded for their colonial/racist policies. UN’s universality has helped proliferation of new states formed after decolonisation, indirectly endorsing achievements of League’s Mandate activity, creating estoppel from denial of recognition.

* Regionalism – League of Nations was universal in aspirations, but really regional in

capabilities or concrete policy, which is clearly evidenced in that its real involvement was

with European events, while it was grossly negligent in dealing with 1932-1935 Bolivia-Paraguay and 1931-34 Manchurian wars, though it was anything but regional organisation formally. Growing membership jeopardises universal organisation’s integrity, potentially leading to resort to organisations of more limited membership16, which are indeed often founded out of necessitating circumstances. UN’s practical experience shows that this is true, especially with collective security organisations, like NATO and Warsaw Pact, which resulted from Super Powers’ flight from veto-bound Security Council and which are not better or worse than UN. NATO, for example, was more respectful of sovereignty and traditional unanimity rule than majoritarian international organisation; most importantly, USA would be able to avoid Soviet vetoes or international majorities in regional area of its influence, where its interests were less likely to be endangered and more likely to prevail naturally or coercively. In this sense, UN followed League practice of self-interest diplomacy in security matters, including alliances, by way of actual regional organisations. It has been argued that world order is pioneered by general, not regional organisations18, while the successful regional organisation of European Union has shown unity in unanimous environment of common interest amongst states of one continent19, with no rivalries over security issues.

The UN Charter, approving generally of existing and anticipated regional organisations in Art. 52(1)20, reflected San Francisco Conference’s wariness about consequences of absent centralised control in League’s experience and stated their purpose to serve UN, handling problems regional in nature, but significant to whole world. This was assured by constituent documents of regional organisations, of which many developed in post-1945 rash for sovereignty preservation. Unfortunately, often such organisations practically loaded UN with problems, which they were specifically designed to counter, though Organisations of African Unity and of American States have helped intraregional conciliation. Certain functions have been segmented from UN and specialised agencies

and UN has cooperated extensively with regional bodies. Regional security organisations did, however, obtain more autonomy from UN overriding control envisaged in Charter, developing collective self-defence practice in 50’s and 60’s22, reflected strongly in NATO action in Serbia in 1999 and US-led action in Iraq in 2003. Therefore, UN has failed to improve League’s problem, despite determination to avoid decentralisation of power, following in its footsteps in that states were still unready to submit to UN jurisdiction fully, which problem disarmed the League in its days. More reflectively, it is submitted that such development being natural and impossible to prevent, it should perhaps not be treated as UN’s failure to learn a lesson, rather as a process, which needs accurate management, any success in which depends on the day’s political climate and change in states’ attitudes.

* Voting – reconciliation of traditional equalitarianism and democratic majoritarianism

caused much trouble for international decision-making. Unanimity was the rule pronounced in Paris Conference 1919 by Lord Robert Cecil, incorporated in Art. 5 League Covenant, further identified in 1925 PCIJ Advisory Opinion as natural and necessary. Difficulty in reaching universal agreement and power of one negative vote to disable a decision have voiced concerns ever since and important changes initiated already in the League, which motivated majoritarian trend in practice, expanding exceptions to the rule, mainly in procedural matters (membership admission). The League’s big step forward made certain decisions in its economic and social activity easier to adopt, though its decision-making was stifled by unanimity rule in crucial political and security measures.

UN has achieved general repudiation of unanimity rule in the Charter, making simple or qualified majorities the standard of international decision-making (Art. 18), showing realisation of pragmatism of majority vote experienced in the League. This improvement over the League is however qualified by veto reserved to five Security Council permanent states on most important activities (enforcement action) – a serious drawback to the rule. Though League’s unanimity requirement both in Council and Assembly had been repudiated, practically League Assembly had already been partially relieved from it by exceptions of majority vote, while in Council stricter adherence to unanimity rule undermined effective operation.

As this exception applies to states, which due to their power status have guarded their precious national sovereignties, and could be expected to do in future, the UN has virtually followed the League. Only consolation to likely abuse would be common practice of abstentions not counting for negative vote, where no national interests were touched. The question, which ensues, is: what can be voted by majority in UN? The answer – non-binding recommendations or Conventions and amendments to constituent documents, which need formal ratification or acceptance for binding effect – is not very promising24, especially that binding non-unanimous decisions are usually only of technical importance and minor political concern. A very significant trend, except in Security Council, towards simple or 2/3 majority decisions in organisational policy and control of activities (adopting binding regulations) has not really improved League experience, but it did consolidate it.

Another problem is that majority voting may reflect distorted view of agreement, as regards total population rather than just number, of member states concurring. It empowers small population states, especially in General Assembly’s expanded world forum, which greatly improves League of Nations’ struggling with giving them any weight. However, how much equity does it provide in reflecting density of world opinion? It may become unrealistic, not reflecting greater portions of world’s real power, and precipitate imbalance between voting power and ability to contribute to world problems resolution. It may be no better than unanimity, nor provide for moral dignity; USSR’s heightened sense of perceived hostile majorities conjured by USA in Security Council led to its occasional use of veto and later, with inflow of Third World largely anti-western Afro-Asian states to General Assembly, occasioned coalitions in anti-western majority resolutions. Majorities have sometimes been achieved ingenuinely, regardless of their positive effect. In post-1955 UN membership expansion, one of such positive results was progressive elimination of colonialism, as Western dominance in General Assembly’s decision-making was vanquishing by 1960’s.

UN was not ruled unrealistically “equally”, however26, and practically great powers have affected small states’ majorities by their military, political and economic weight; from late 1960’s, consensus often had to be reached, some of forced nature, effectively denying majority decisions their effect, and such measures27 were still politically and legally authoritative, though adopted without vote. So, Western powers (USA) threatened to withhold, or condition grant of, financial resources from UN programs for assistance of developing states, as with UNCTAD in 1964 and UNCDF in 1966, both adopted by developing countries’ majorities, but conciliated with those few developed states who had capacity for effecting proposals. The fact that small states’ action in General Assembly was not considered legally threatening by large states shows that UN had not absolutely escaped League’s attitude. It is submitted that unanimity may reflect reality of world affairs more, subject to abuse, but most importantly that it may and should be used as engine in international issues over which there is no realistic agreement, to negotiate for consensus through subsequent persuasion and compromise.

* Veto – Art. 23, 27 UN Charter convey that a decision cannot be made if one state does not concur. In reality, UN Security Council has followed League’s practice of not counting abstentions or absences from decision-making process, which may be weak consolation as regards political morality, but is still a welcome oft-used technicality28, which shows ability and will to develop international organisation’s constitution by practice, even if conflicting with document, to ensure practical efficacy. It is argued that UN Charter included veto provision in Security Council as incentive for bringing and keeping decisively important states, also giving them permanent representation29, in international organisation. Though it has been blamed for all UN’s wrongs, it is not a blind repetition of and failure to learn from League’s negative experience; without argument, it was a concession to reality of existing power formation in the world at the time and improves over League in that it is restricted to states, which matter, not those which by their power cannot realistically prevent decisions.

A stalemate bringing inactivity may be overcome, but a showdown in face of great power opposition may be destructive30. Actually, the veto was not primarily why League had collapsed and many informed commentators identify unfortunate circumstances and mistaken policies, not intrinsic (constitutional) defects, as the reason. Precisely, great power unanimity in UN was designed to prevent such League’s military failures as countering Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, reflecting genuine world power distribution, where a strong state is not ready to support UN action. Importantly, veto does not give more votes, but stronger votes, and only for preventing enforcement action, not promoting it. It is a necessary weighting counter-device against burdensome majorities, analogous to weighted voting in UN financial organisations.

The veto problem has possibly been exaggerated, as vetoes have been mitigated by alternative arrangements, like peace-keeping; use of veto has been declining, but it also contributed to important constitutional development in UN. So, it may merit not viewing it negatively; ultimately, a constitution-challenging approach of disregarding it is not worse than veto against Charter spirit. Clearly, problems with veto fall into different political context from one possibly envisaged during Charter-drafting, which often disabled its genuine and reasonable use.

* Constitutional Development – constitutions grow through custom, interpretation and elaboration, as does UN Charter on daily application35. UN Charter does not entail

provision for resolving disputes regarding meaning of basic provisions, which led to alternative approaches: states’ sovereign unilateral interpretation36, as in the League; ICJ’s interpretation as principal judicial organ; and General Assembly’s interpretation through UN practice enlarging organisation’s competence. Realistically, interpretation issue was left open at San Francisco Conference deliberately; states foresaw as inevitable assertion of each organ’s right to interpret UN Charter for itself38. Indeed, anti-judicialism prevailed -the General Assembly Resolution 17139 directing UN organs to utilise ICJ greatly has had little impact, ICJ giving less advisory opinions than PCIJ, never mind their non-bindingness. UN organs sometimes overrode allegations of incompetence, ignoring member states’ unilateral interpretation rights, and importantly legal assistance was normally sought from ICJ in case of conflict or challenge only.

It may be argued that UN did not escape League’s sovereignty problem – lack of effective supranational authority – which does not truly achieve recognition of institutional competence development40. Ofcourse there have been some significant advisory opinions, like PCIJ 1922 and 1926 opinions that ILO’s43 competence could be extended by interpretation of its constituent document; 1949 ICJ interpretation that UN organs’ international personality is deduced from original intentions and powers necessarily implied for performance of duties; and 1962 ICJ interpretation of General Assembly’s implied authority (Art. 17(2)) to oblige states to finance extraordinary peace-keeping operations and large-scale programs. Importantly, these and other advisory opinions show supportive legal standpoint on many practices, particularly General Assembly’s expanding powers, generally accepted today, developing in League and UN and adopted in UN with Secretaries General strong support.

Despite separation of powers of Security Council – high politics/security issues – and General Assembly – organisational housekeeping and economic/social activities – stressed at San Francisco and Dumbarton Oaks conferences and implemented in UN

Charter50 to correct League Covenant’s failure, realistically this specialisation did not endure in practice.

General Assembly ‘Uniting for Peace’ Resolution 1950 virtually replaced

Security Council with General Assembly, amazingly without formal amendment, empowering itself to call for enforcement action where vetoed in Council. Such progressive development of international organisation’s operational features is not

explained simply by US attempts to dilute opposition in Security Council, escaping Soviet vetoes, but owes much to enlarging community environment. Pressures from small states – international organisation’s majorities – to have real say in political/security matters, which was only possible in General Assembly where they were equal with great powers, should not be ignored. Infact, great powers themselves as a group advanced this development, Soviet Union contributing strongly. The move to General Assembly was not just forced,

but deliberate; great powers’ flaw of West and East alignment tendencies, despite improved common participation in UN compared to League, made General Assembly political environment, devoid of face to face ideological clashes, superior and desirable. The UN has followed League Assembly experience closely for same reasons. Interestingly, the non-irreversible nature of this development was evident in a desired return to Security Council in resolving Cold War due to dissatisfaction with states’ artificial weights in General Assembly; S.C. Resolution 678 (1991) had authorised enforcement action in Iraq.

Outside Security Council domain, General Assembly had also intervened in Economic and Social Council’s operation by pumping international resources into economic/social development and Trusteeship Council’ work by pressurising to end colonial rule. This brought UN much further than League and was not foreseen in its Charter. Is real use of UN, which by 1950’s transformed many Charter provisions, more indicative of inherent defects in Charter or of sovereign states’ practices in loosely structured international system?

Regarding domestic jurisdiction, League Covenant has stated that state sovereignty prevailed over international authority, unless competence was delegated to organisation by member states, which was not easily presumed. PCIJ has interpreted that a domestic issue is submitted to international jurisdiction by state’s acceptance of treaty obligations and international organisation only has powers attributed to it in such treaty. In UN, Art. 2(7) of Charter also retained ‘non-intervention in domestic affairs’ principle, except Chapter VII enforcement action.

The Charter left free space for states to advance own interpretation; from UN’s operation, a trend towards all-encompassing competence evolves and members are believed to have committed themselves to it, having created Economic and Social Council, incorporated Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories into Charter, and promoted human rights. This follows League practice. Importantly, states themselves often agreed that even if an issue may technically be domestic, once its degree threatens world peace and security, UN shall have authority to intervene, as in humanitarian intervention practice (Serbia and Montenegro 1998-99). Such crafty Charter interpretation proves again that apparent defects in constitution do not fail international organisations. Particularly significant was prevention of using domestic jurisdiction clause for non-involvement in European powers’ colonial affairs – a great improvement over League. Unfortunately, naturally domestic jurisdiction sensitivity means that states claim international jurisdiction against others, but still rely on domestic jurisdiction in matters affecting them.

* International Secretariat – an international body of nations’ civil servants in individual capacity, independent of governmental allegiance, was envisaged and adopted by Sir Eric Drummond in the League, supported by Council’s ratification on May 19, 1920 and subsequent binding measures. This innovative creation became influential in administrative operation of international organisations, leaving concrete results for UN, and specialised agencies, to adopt in its classical features in the Charter – Art. 100 (primary allegiance to organisation) – on premise of its actual success in attaining impartial efficient administration, rather than in idealistic hope of making success out of League’s failure.

UN realised early a need for much larger staff than in the League, because of organisation’s comparative growth and because League Secretariat had represented strictly

European civil workers’ sphere. UN Charter’s similar to League Covenant’s premise of wide geographical basis of staff recruitment (Art. 101(3)) had practically encountered Western nationals’ occupation of many important positions and progressive enlargement of non-European staff. Western states’ competition for quotas, determined by membership, population and budget contributions, resembling League states’ attitude that national representation should extend to secretariat, precipitated Soviet and African contentions against qualitative Western dominance in 1960’s. Simultaneously, practical complications with recruiting Soviet and African nationals, like incompliance with appropriate qualifications standard, had affected UN’s administrative efficiency just as its expansive workload had done cumulatively. Insufficient monetary contributions from governments to UN’s budget have frozen recruitment since 1980’s. Sadly, leading powers have occasionally threatened to leave UN if pressurised to pay, exploiting League’s weakness, which UN was cautious to prevent, avoiding punitive actions and negotiating gentlemen’s agreements, thereby practically modifying Art. 19 sanction of states losing voting rights.

General Assembly followed League’s measures consolidating international staff immunity by adopting General Convention on Privileges and Immunities of United

Nations 1946, ratified by more than 2/3 of members. However, not only were Undersecretary-General and Assistant Secretary General in League and UN political statesmen responsible to national offices, but the Secretariat was also disarmed in 1950’s scandal with American communist staff. UN has battled to defend staff immunity from US government attacks on its communist nationals, but lost and had to remove these staff members. This twisted political dimension was novel to League’s idea of immune administration and UN’s concession to US government had damaged not only efficiency and integrity, but also morale of Secretariat, making recovery slow and difficult.

Secretary Generalship in UN had been based on Frenchman Albert Thomas’ model of political international chief executive, preferred to Drummond’s overwhelmingly administrative, apolitical office. First UN Secretary General Trygve Lie experienced unprecedented political powers, like ability to strongly influence various organs’ agenda, freely participate in Security Council and General Assembly debates, express legal opinions, conduct research, draft resolutions, amongst others. He supported US-led collective action in Korea in 1950. Though these actions do not have coercive capacity, the office functions have become progressively influential.

The second Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold has balanced between quiet, also following Drummond’s supervisory administrative practice, and preventive diplomacy. The latter was in organising and directing peace-keeping operations with General Assembly’s authority, which he actually bore precedent to by his initiative in Suez Canal Crisis 1956, most importantly in Congo in 1960, which helped mitigate collective security inoperativeness. Such wide, shifting borders of office were increasingly opposed by Soviet Union and there was no agreement on their legitimacy in Security Council. While many similar functions were exercised practically by League Secretaries General, UN Secretary General’s expansion of functions into political realm was founded on Art. 98 UN Charter, which was broadly interpreted to give authorisation to exercise functions entrusted to him by UN organs. Effectively, the factual evolution of his role has resulted not so much from Charter’s letter, but through practice in according events and circumstances. Additionally, Hammarskjold interpreted his independent position to act in absence of political organs’ authority, but in accordance with Charter’s aims and principles (Lebanese Crisis 1958). Despite Soviet proposals for triple executive, Hammarskjold managed to protect his office’s integrity, refusing to resign67, subordinating occasions of allegations against international staff to UN’s independent determination. Subsequent officeholders became considerably restricted in this independence.


The League of Nations has contributed to UN more than any other institution.

UN’s operational progress over longer period than allocated to League historically has shown that many League’s constitutional features were reasonable enough to be adopted in future. Retention of national sovereignty in Charter (Art. 2(1)) may have been UN’s major failed lesson, but it is hardly credible whether its exclusion or prohibition would prevent its practical restoration in a post-World War atmosphere.


1 see, in particular, Philippe Sands and Pierre Klein, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions, 5th Ed., Sweet ; Maxwell 2001, p. 13.

2 for example, Washington Naval Treaty 1921-22.

3 A. LeRoy Bennett, International Organisations: Principles and Issues, 6th Ed. (1995), p. 40.

4 Clive Archer, International Organizations, 2nd Ed., Routledge: London and New York (1992), p. 25.

5 ibid., p. 27; but, see E. Lauterpacht, International Law, Being the Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht, vol. 1, Cambridge: CUP (1970), p. 19.

6 League of Nations Covenant, Art. 1, 26(2), 16(4).

7 see P. Sands and P. Klein, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions, 5th Ed., Sweet & Maxwell 2001, p. 12

8 see Jan Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law, Cambridge: CUP (2002), p. 105.

9 see Jan Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law, Cambridge: CUP (2002), p. 124-125.

10 see Jan Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law, Cambridge: CUP (2002), p. 120-121.

11 Art. 108 and 109.

12 East and West Germany joined in 1973; China not represented until 1971.

13 see Jan Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law, Cambridge: CUP (2002), p. 108.

14 see Jan Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law, Cambridge: CUP (2002), p. 106.

15 see Edward H. Carr, Nationalism and After, London: Macmillan (1945); also see Clive Archer, International Organizations, 2nd Ed., Routledge: London and New York (1992), p. 45.

16 see Clive Archer, International Organizations, 2nd Ed., Routledge: London and New York (1992), p. 28.

17 see A. de Russett, Strengthening the Framework of Peace, London: RIIA (1950) and R. Yalem, Regionalism and World Order, Washington DC: Public Affairs Press (1965).

18 see Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares: the Problems and Progress of International Organisation, 4th Ed., New York: Random House (1971), p. 108

19 see Clive Archer, International Organizations, 2nd Ed., Routledge: London and New York (1992), p. 48.

20 also Articles 23(1), 33(1) and others.

21 see

22 Guatemala, 1954; Dominican Republic, 1960, 65; Cuba, 1960-62.

23 see Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares: the Problems and Progress of International Organisation, p. 117; also see C. Eagleton, International Government, New York: Ronald (1948).

24 see, however, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions, 5th Ed., Sweet ; Maxwell (2001) at p. 262.

25 see Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares, 4th Ed., New York: Random House (1971), p. 125.

26 see Clive Archer, International Organizations, 2nd Ed., Routledge: London and New York (1992), p. 64.

27 for example, GA Resolution 2625 (1970) approving Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States.

28 f.e., Charter amendment expanding Council membership from 11 to 15 – no permanent member concurred.

29 see Z. Klepacki, The Organs of International Organizations, Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff and Noordhoff.

30 see Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares, 4th Ed., New York: Random House (1971), p. 157.

31 see Philip C. Jessup, New York Times Magazine, October 23rd, 1949 in L. Leonard, International Organisation, New York: McGraw-Hill (1951).

32 for example, in the World Bank voting power is proportional to financial contribution.

33 particularly, G.A. Uniting For Peace Resolution 1950 empowering G.A. to substitute veto-bound S.C.

34 see Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares, 4th Ed., New York: Random House (1971), p. 151.

35 see Pollux, The Interpretation of the Charter, 23 British Yearbook of International Law 54 (1946).

36 favoured by L. Kopelmanas, L’Organisation des Nations Unies (1947).

37 see D. Simon, L’interpretation judiciaire des traites d’organisations internationales (1981), p. 308.

38 Report of Rapporteur of Committee IV/2, Doc. 933 IV/2/42 (2), 13 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 645 (1945); Pollux.

39 1947-1948 I.C.J.Y.B. (1948); see T. Sato, Evolving Constitutions of International Organizations, Kluwer Law International (1996), p. COMPLETE!!!.

40 see Gross, A., “States as Organs of International Law and the Problem of Autointerpretation” in Law and Politics in the World Community: Essays on Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory and Related Problems in International Law 59, Ed. G.A. Lipsky (1953).

41 Competence of the Internatioal Labour Orgnaisation to Regulate the Conditions of Labour of Persons Employed in Agriculture, advisory opinion, [1922] Publ. PCIJ, Series B, nos. 2 ; 3.

42 Competence of the Internatioal Labour Orgnaisation to Regulate, Incidentally, the Personal Work of the Employer, advisory opinion, [1926] Publ. PCIJ, Series B, no. 13.

43 International Labour Organisation, established in 1919.

44 see Jan Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law, Cambridge University Press (2002), p. 61-63.

45 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of United Nations, advisory opinion [1949] ICJ Reports 174

46 supported by Effects of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, [1954] ICJ Reports 47.

47 Certain Expenses of the United Nations, advisory opinion, [1962] ICJ Reports 151

48 for PCIJ and ICJ jurisprudence analysis, see Jan Klabbers, p. 60-78.

49 D. Bowett, United Nations Forces, A Legal Study of United Nations Practice, (1964).

50 UN Charter, Art. 11, 12, 24, 25, 39-54.

51 for example, see Stettinius Report by American Secretary of State Stettinius.

52 consider General Assembly action in Palestine Case 1947; Korean War 1950; and Congo operations 1962.

53 G.A. Res. 377A (V) November 3, 1950.

54 see Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares, 4th Ed., New York: Random House (1971), p. 179.

55 see Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, advisory opinion, [1971] ICJ Reports 16.

56 see J. Robinson, “Metamorphosis of the United Nations”, 94 Recueil des cours 493 (1958).

57 see Case of the SS Lotus, [1927] Publ. PCIJ, Series A, no. 10.

58 Nationality Decrees issued in Tunis and Morocco (French Zone), advisory opinion, [1923] Publ. PCIJ, Series B, no. 4.

59 Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube between Galatz and Braila, advisory opinion, [1926] Publ. PCIJ, Series B, no. 14.

60 see Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares, 4th Ed., New York: Random House (1971), p. 188; see also D. F. Fleming, The United States and the League of Nations, 1918-1920, New York: Putnam’s (1932).

61 also see, UN Staff Regulations 1.1 and 1.3.

62 see The International Secretariat: A Great Experiment in International Administration, Washington (1945)

63 see Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares, 4th Ed., New York: Random House (1971), p. 194.

64 see GA Res. 35/210 (1980) and 41/206 (1986).

65 see also the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel 1994, which similarly protects impartial and international nature of UN and its personnel’s duties.

66 see Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares, 4th Ed., New York: Random House (1971), p. 205.

67 but, see Clive Archer, International Organizations, 2nd Ed, Routledge: London and New York (1992), p 66

68 Potter, An Introduction to the Study of International Organisation, 5th Ed., 1948.